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The New Federal Anti-Dilution Act: 
Reinstating the Myth of "Likely'' 
Dilutive Harm as a Mask for Anti-
Free-Rider Liability 
By DAVID J. FRANKLYN* 
The new federal anti-dilution act, the Trademark Dilution Revi-
sion Act of 2006 (the "TDRA"),1 promises to restore an anti-free-
rider tool to the hands of judges who wish to grant expansive trade-
mark rights to famous mark owners. The impulse to provide this kind 
of relief is grounded in a sound principle: between the entity that cre-
ated the famous mark and others who wish to profit from it in foresee-
able collateral markets, the mark creator is usually the party that has a 
superior claim to capture that collateral value and to ensure the value 
of the mark for future exploitation in a variety of contexts. 
The problem, of course, is that this theory in no way explicitly 
supports the TDRA, nor does the TDRA articulate how such a doc-
trine ought to be applied.2 This is because the TDRA continues to be 
grounded-officially, at least-in the rhetoric of dilution theory. As I 
have written elsewhere, it is not that a case for dilution theory cannot 
be made.3 It can. It is just that dilution is not the most natural or com-
pelling rationale for providing expansive protection for famous 
trademarks. 
Dilution theory depends on a quite unnatural and attenuated set 
of assumptions about the ways in which collateral uses of famous 
marks might harm those marks. The basic notion is that a collateral 
use can dilute the selling power or commercial magnetism of the fa-
mous mark if it is allowed to continue over time. On this theory, the 
introduction of GOOGLE candy bars would eventually weaken the 
power of the existing GOOGLE search engine mark because 
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1. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (the "TDRA''), Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
1730 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)). 
2. It is not my intent in this short piece to summarize the TDRA, nor to critique it generally. For 
that sort of treatment see Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 
INTELL. PRoP. L. BuLL. 187 (2007); Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Anti-
Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006). 
3. David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-
Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HAsTINGS L.J. 117 (2004). 
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GOGGLE would cease to be uniquely and singularly associated with 
search engine services in the minds of consumers. 
The ambiguity in the legal inquiry comes for many reasons,4 but 
key is that legislatures and courts have never been clear about 
whether the likelihood of dilutive harm is to be limited to the collat-
eral use that is currently before the court in a particular suit, or 
whether it should include all other collateral uses that might come 
down the pike should the court not step in at an early time and stop 
the free-riding. 
The difference between the two approaches is significant. If only 
the use before the court is to be considered, the likelihood of dilution 
is usually going to be less than if one were to consider the potential 
dilutive effects of all unauthorized potential future collateral uses of 
the famous mark. This is so because fifty GOGGLEs on fifty different 
products coming from fifty different sources surely is more likely to 
dilute the selling power of the original GOOGLE brand than only one 
such use. 
The ambiguity in the inquiry is not easy to solve. One might ar-
gue that only the use before the court should be considered; that any-
thing else is too speculative, given that we can never really be sure 
how many other collateral users will follow suit if the first such unau-
thorized use is permitted by a court. And, indeed, this argument has 
much power. Conversely, one might argue that we cannot limit plain-
tiff to recovery only in situations where the current use is already di-
luting. To do so would frequently require plaintiffs to wait until there 
were multiple users piling on. By waiting that long, plaintiffs would 
lose control over their marks, and courts would have a much more 
difficult, if not impossible time, remedying the situation. The whole 
object of this theory is to allow famous mark owners to prevent this 
sort of injury from occurring before it occurs, so they can preserve the 
commercial magnetism and selling power of their famous brands. 
How should we respond to this inherent ambiguity? As tempting 
as it would be to require plaintiffs to prove that other dominoes are 
likely to fall if this one falls, there is really no good way to prove that 
sort of thing.5 But making the plaintiff wait for multiple dilutive uses 
to pile up seems silly as well. The ambiguity of this space, I contend, 
gets filled up with something else. Judges and juries are likely to turn 
to the overall equities of the situation. 
If one believes that free-riding on famous marks is wrong (as a 
type of unjust enrichment), and if one believes the defendant is clearly 
4. Other reasons are that there is no good way to measure the decrease in selling power of a 
mark or that any such decrease is due in particular to the activities of the defendant. 
5. In the most recent edition of his treatise, Professor McCarthy attempts to sketch out a scena-
rio where plaintiff might be required to prove the likelihood of the other dominoes falling. J. THOMAS 
McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 23 (4th ed. 2004). The at-
tempt is noble. It is understandable, given the indeterminacy of the status quo. but it is unclear if 
plaintiffs are allowed to proceed on speculation alone. Ultimately, it cannot be done. 
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free-riding, one will probably "find" dilution likely and skip over the 
niceties of the analysis. If, on the other hand, one is not too bothered 
by free-riding on famous marks, or if one sees a justification for the 
free-riding, one is likely to take a stricter approach to the dilution in-
quiry and "find" dilution is not likely. There is plenty of elasticity in 
the theory to allow the fact finder to go either way. 
The Supreme Court tried to tighten up that elasticity in the Mose-
ley case when it held that plaintiffs must show "actual" dilution in 
order to recover under the former federal anti-dilution act.6 The 
Court grounded this holding on the wording of the former act in that 
nowhere does the act state "likely" dilution.7 And therefore, because 
Congress knew how to say "likely," but chose not to, Congress clearly 
intended to restrict dilution to cases where the particular collateral 
use before a court was already causing dilution.8 
Although the Moseley case is formalistically grounded on a sup-
posed interpretation of Congressional intent, it seems much more 
likely that the Court was concerned about the inherent and unsolvable 
ambiguity in the dilution theory if it were not limited in this fashion. 
One cannot skip ahead to multiple other speculative future collateral 
uses if actual dilution is the standard. Of course, the Court's quite 
narrow approach had the opposite effect-that of making it nearly 
impossible for a plaintiff to win a federal dilution case. Just as it is 
nearly impossible to show that future collateral uses are likely if the 
current one is not stopped, it is nearly impossible to show that the 
single collateral use before the court is already causing dilution to the 
famous mark. 
The Supreme Court's confidence in Congressional intent was ap-
parently misplaced. Congress responded to Moseley by effectively 
overturning it with the TDRA. The TDRA makes it quite clear that 
likely dilution is the operative standard for federal anti-dilution 
claims.9 We are back to where we started. Dilution is once again a 
wide-open and very ambiguous inquiry. 
The TDRA does not specify whether the plaintiff should be re-
quired to show that the particular use before the court is likely to 
dilute the commercial magnetism of the plaintiffs' famous mark or 
whether, conversely, the plaintiff can argue that dilution is likely to 
occur if multiple collateral uses materialize down the road. There is 
nothing in the TDRA that could prevent a court from assuming that 
such uses could later materialize. Nor is there any way to cabin the 
inquiry. The only apparent break on a purely speculative outcome is 
the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs the analysis, 
and that does not seem to be much of a break. 
6. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
7. /d. at 433. 
8. /d. 
9. TDRA § 2(c)(l). 
202 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. [Vol. 11: 199 
All of this is troubling because it perpetuates the myth of dilution 
law as something real, instead of what it is: a mask for the anti-free-
rider impulse. As I have argued elsewhere, dilution law purports to be 
about protecting marks from dilutive harm, but it frequently is about 
preventing free-riding on famous brands.10 If this is so, it would be 
better to be up front about it and specify in the statute that "taking 
unfair advantage" of a famous brand is a separate ground for liability 
as the Member States of the European Union do,11 and to develop a 
cohesive theory for when such free-riding is actionable and when it is 
not. That is not easy to do. Free-riding is rife with its own ambiguities. 
It is fraught with indeterminacy. And, to some, it is not worth the 
candle. But if anti-free-rider impulse is what we are really talking 
about, we would be much better off having an honest conversation 
about the true competing interests involved. 
The true competing interests turn on whether free-riding on a fa-
mous mark is justifiable in a given case. That, in turn, is likely to be 
determined by examining the nature of the plaintiff's mark: whether it 
is comprised of largely common words; whether the free-riding was 
intentional; whether there is a logical relationship between the defen-
dant's use of the famous mark and the nature of its own goods or 
services; whether the collateral use of the plaintiff's mark was in an 
area or areas reasonably exploited by the plaintiff (i.e., whether al-
lowing the plaintiff to capture and control the collateral value is rea-
sonable); and whether the defendant has reasons to use the mark that 
are based on language sharing and expressive freedom. 
Congress, in enacting the new anti-dilution statute, has, unfortu-
nately, largely sidestepped this enquiry. I say largely because the 
TDRA specifies significant fair use defenses, explicitly parody and 
criticism defenses. 12 It also limits liability in several important re-
spects, some of which, I think, are based on free-riding justifications, 
such as nominative and classic fair use. But all of this falls under the 
rubric of traditional dilution theory and not in the context of articulat-
ing the key factors in the anti-free-riding balancing analysis that needs 
to be done and that probably will continue to be done by judges and 
juries applying the new act. 
There is no mention in the TDRA of "taking unfair advantage" 
of a famous mark as a separate source of liability. There is no require-
ment that the free-riding be intentional, per se, although that idea is 
lurking in the background. There is no attempt to limit the dilution 
cause of action to the class of cases where it might make the most 
sense, i.e., the protection of coined or quasi-coined marks. Indeed, the 
TDRA states the contrary, that the plaintiff's mark need only be dis-
10. Franklyn, supra note 4. 
11. See Council Directive 89/104/EEC of Dec. 21, 1988, To Approximate the Laws of the Mem-
ber States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 5(2), 1989 O.J. (L 40) p. 1-7. 
12. TDRA § 3(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
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tinctive in the sense that it has obtained secondary meaning.U This is 
quite broad and, I think, a mistake.14 
Of course, it might be argued that dilution is washed up and 
ought to be scrapped, not replaced with an explicit anti-free-rider 
cause of action. This is the view of Professor Bone.15 Professor Bone's 
position is well documented and I do not take issue with his argument 
that dilution law is problematic as conceived. But he is wrong when he 
states that dilution theory cannot be premised on the anti-free-rider 
principle.16 The concept of unjust enrichment has a long pedigree in 
intellectual property law. It forms the foundation of many other doc-
trines; indeed, it is the cornerstone of the right of publicityY What is 
the right of publicity if not a right to protect one's name and image 
from being "diluted" through over use or misuse by others and a right 
to capture the reasonable collateral value that accrues from one's per-
sonal fame? That right is quite analogous to the anti-dilution rights 
conferred upon famous trademarks. 
I will not restate all of the reasons why some form of expansive 
property-like protection for some types of trademarks can be justi-
fied-on both equitable and economic grounds-under the rubric of 
unjust enrichment or anti-free-rider theory; I have set forth such a 
rational in another piece.18 The basic argument is that as between the 
person who creates the famous mark and third party who wishes to 
exploit its value in a collateral (albeit non-confusing) manner, it seems 
quite acceptable to require the would-be exploiter to pay a reasonable 
royalty to the mark owner. 
Thus, even if nobody thinks GOOGLE candy bars come from the 
search engine company, most of us have an intuitive sense that the 
candy company should not be permitted to appropriate the GOOGLE 
brand in this manner. And our intuition does not rest readily or natu-
rally on the concern that the candy company's use will "dilute" the 
selling power of the search engine name. Rather, it rests on a sense 
that the candy company is "reaping where it has not sown," and that 
there is no good reason for allowing it to do so. 
To be sure, it might make economic sense to place broad control 
over the GOOGLE brand in the hands of the search engine company, 
so as to ensure maximization of the brand image. And lurking in the 
background may be a fear of potential harm to the mark if uncon-
trolled use is allowed. But those are secondary concerns. The primary 
13. TDRA § 3(c)(1). 
14. The TDRA does attempt to limit dilution law by eliminating niche market fame, by requiring 
national fame; by making it clear that only commercial trademark uses ("use as a source identifier") 
are potentially actionable; and by setting out an expansive list of defenses, including nominative and 
classic fair use. 
15. Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BuLL. 187 (2007). 
16. /d. at 189. 
17. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY§ 1:30 (2d ed. 2000). 
18. See Franklyn, supra note 4. 
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concern is with preventing the unjust enrichment by the candy com-
pany. That seems straightforward to me. It probably is the sort of intu-
ition that has motivated Congress to reverse the Supreme Court and 
undo the Moseley decision. And it undoubtedly has been and will con-
tinue to be part of the intuitional mix that guides judges and jurors 
who decide these cases under the TD RA. 
